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 E-commerce can be considered a new topic in China. Due to its fast growth in term of 
market volume and number of shoppers, many researchers start to give attention to study its 
various aspects. In this paper, we formulate pricing models using a combination of consumer 
utility maximization function and spatial model to predict pricing strategy of different types 
of retailers. We examine the change in pricing strategy across markets from a market without 
online competition to a market with an online monopoly store and then with online 
competitive equilibrium market. The effects from marginal cost, opportunity cost for 
shopping and number of store on price are predicted based on our models. We generate a 
pricing model for a store that sells its product both online and offline and compare it to the 
models of online and offline only stores. We introduce a parameter for internet penetration 
rate and predict its effect on pricing strategy of different types of store. 
 In the empirical part, we collect price data from both online and offline book stores 
across China. Price of book is chosen for analysis due to the homogeneous nature and the 
suitability for online sale. Prices of offline store are collected from different cities based on 
online shopping penetration rate. The online prices are collected randomly from a price 
comparison website including the delivery fee. Ordinary least square regression is used to test 
the prices in accordance to what our models predicted. We confirmed that the online price is 
lower. However when the delivery fee is included, one of the books’ price becomes more 
expensive online than offline. We then test the difference in price of a pure online retailer and 
a store which sells both online and offline. There is no clear difference in the prices of these 
types of store. The regression is also used to test the difference in prices of offline stores in 
cities with different internet penetration rates. We found a negative but insignificant effect 
between price and the internet penetration rate. 
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E-Commerce Price Theory – Application on Chinese Market 
 
Introduction 
E-commerce has become increasingly important in China retail market. In 2010, 
China’s 420 million internet users spend around a billion hours each day online and 185 
million made at least one online purchase. This makes China the world’s largest online retail 
market in term of shoppers. That year China’s online shopping industry had a turnover of $80 
billion, and grew on average 87% year-on-year. (BBC News, Business, 29 Aug 2011) 
With higher contribution of e-commerce in China retail market, attention has been 
given to investigate its impact on market structure and level of competition. As part of this 
investigation, we simulate pricing models for both online and offline retailers based on 
different market structures. Certain parameters are analyzed for their effects on prices across 
markets. We employ a spatial model for oligopoly to generate the price strategies for online 
and traditional stores (later in this paper, traditional stores will be referred as B&M, brick and 
mortar stores). We modify the models to analyze the pricing strategy of a special type of 
retailer who sells through both online and offline channels (denoted as mixed retailer). We 
also add in a parameter for internet penetration rate to investigate its effect on price and profit. 
Finally the predictions of the models will be tested using price data from book stores across 
China. 
The model derives demand from consumers’ maximization problems given the 
transportation cost, internet navigation cost and prices online and offline. The prices 
relationship is derived under the assumption of competitive equilibrium. The empirical 
analysis of price data provides some evidences of what the models predicted. Also some 
useful assumptions are proved to be reliable. 
The price data enable us to compare the prices of retailers selling only through 
internet (denoted as pure internet retailers) with those from mixed retailer. The model clearly 
indicates the difference in prices between these two retailers, however the empirical analysis 
does not clearly support our claim. 
Given the current internet penetration rate in China of 30% (Winning in China, The 
Neilson Company, 2011) compare to over 70% in other developed countries like Japan and 















China’s uniqueness in country size, population, economic policy and growth pattern, it is 
expected that its e-commerce market would also possess some new features. It is important to 
understand the mechanism in this new emerging market and prepare for its impact in the near 
future. We use a model of horizontal product differentiation to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How do online prices differ from prices in B&M stores? 
2. Do mixed retailers set their prices differently from internet only retailers or B&M 
only retailers? 
3. How does the internet penetration rate effect prices and profits of stores? 
Answers to the above questions would give some guidelines to generate more 
accurate pricing models to predict the effect on price with regard to expecting changes in 
variables such as lower transport fee, higher opportunity cost of shopping in B&M stores and 
higher internet penetration rate. Various marketing strategies could be developed using the 
result of this paper to excel in online market. B&M retailers could prepare for any disruptive 
impact on their businesses from this fast growing market. 
Given the different online shopping penetration rates of cities in China, for example 
36.7% in Xiamen compare to over 50% in Beijing and Shanghai (Rocky Fu, 2009, China 
Internet Watch), and the homogeneity of the products being studied in this paper, it is likely 
that B&M stores in these cities will price differently. The B&M stores in cities with low 
online shopping penetration rate will likely price their products regardless of their online 
competitors. It is expected to see higher prices in B&M stores located in such cities. 
For mixed retailers, it is expected that they will set both the online and offline prices 
higher than their competitors’. This is because the online and offline products are seen as 
substitutes. The marginal revenue from an increase in price is higher for mixed retailers 
relative to B&M only or online only retailers. 
Literature Review 
There are two main types of study on the price difference between online and offline 
products and the effect of online market on price. The first and the most common type is 
empirical study where actual online and offline price data are investigated using various 















Lee (1998) conducted one of the first studies involving pricing in electronic market. 
His study analyzed prices in electronic and conventional auction markets for used cars sold 
from 1986 to 1995. Lee found that prices in the electronic market were higher than prices in 
the conventional market and that this price difference seemed to increase over time. However, 
Lee didn’t control for the quality of car in both markets. Cars sold in electronic market are 
generally newer than cars in conventional market. The auction market is also not comparable 
to retail market being studied in this paper. 
Bailey (1998a, 1998b) examined internet market efficiency by comparing the prices 
for books, CDs, and software sold on the internet and in conventional channels in 1996 and 
1997. The homogeneity of these products and the matching of products across channels 
eliminated the error that could rise from different product quality. As with Lee, Bailey found 
higher prices in the electronic channel for each product category during this time period. He 
argued that the higher prices on internet could be due to market immaturity as Amazon.com 
was still dominant in this market at the time of research. 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999) examined prices for books and CDs sold through 
internet and conventional channels in 1998 and 1999. Unlike Bailey, they found that prices 
were 9-16% lower on the internet than in conventional outlets even after accounting for costs 
from shipping and handling, delivery, and local sales taxes. The differences between their 
methodologies and Bailey’s included the retailers, the products and the time period sampled. 
The difference in their results was possibly because the internet market became more 
efficient. 
Sengupta and Wiggins (2006) conducted research on airline ticket prices using a very 
comprehensive ticket purchase data set. Many ticket characteristics, carrier and route effects 
were controlled for using simple regression technique. They found that the tickets sold online 
were about 13% cheaper than the offline tickets and an increase in 10% of tickets sold online 
would lead to a 5% decrease in average industry price. 
It is not certain that the above empirical results can be generalized into Chinese 
market due to different market characteristics and stage of market development. According to 
a survey conducted by Data Center of China Internet, lower online price is the second main 
reason why Chinese choose to shop online. This may be due to the fact that online prices are 















lower price online. There is no empirical evidence whether the online price is really lower 
than B&M price due to limited availability of price data in China. 
The second type of study is based on theoretical framework. The research by Richard 
Friberg and his team (2000) on Swedish book and CD retail markets is the paper that gives a 
motivation to this research. It is one of a few researches which tried to come up with a pricing 
model to explain the difference in pricing strategies of online and offline retailers. In their 
paper, they constructed a pricing model base on consumer utility maximization. They found 
out that B&M price should be higher than online price and will depend on the opportunity 
cost of shopping and the fraction of consumer who has internet access. Their model also 
predicts that mixed retailers will charge higher price than pure retailers. Their results were 
supported by empirical evidence from the actual price data of books and CDs except for the 
result on mixed retailers. 
Theoretical work which is similar to the model presented in this paper is by Oksana 
Loginova (2007). This paper extended the model presented by Friberg by combining the 
concept of consumer maximization with spatial model and circular-city paradigm. Base on 
Oksana’s model, equilibrium price is determined by the consumer valuation of product and 
the fraction of consumers who do not wish and cannot purchase the product online. The paper 
focused on the effect of internet on consumer welfare. There was no empirical evidence for 
Oksana’s research. 
In this paper we also used a combination of consumer utility maximization and the 
spatial model in a circular market (Salop 1979) to construct the price models. Unlike 
Oksana’s study, we kept consumer valuation of the product constant and derived equilibrium 
price base on profit maximization of B&M and online stores. We studied the effect of 
parameters including marginal cost, opportunity cost and number of B&M store on 
equilibrium price and profit of B&M and online stores. We retested what Friberg proposed 
from his models using our own models and found similar results. For example the mixed 
retailers should charge higher price than pure retailers and internet penetration rate would 
have negative effect on B&M price. We also provided empirical evidence using price data of 
books in Chinese market. It should be noted that the price data found in Swedish market 
represents different stages of online market development from Chinese market. Swedish 
internet penetration rate at the time of Friberg’s study was 60% compared to China of around 















The Basic Model 
 We applied a simple spatial model based on the work of Hotelling (1929) with the 
model development from Salop (1979) and Economides (1989). Consumers have identical 
preference and are distributed equally along a circular market. Products are identical between 
firms and each consumer will buy at most one unit of the product. Consumers maximize their 
utility based on the delivered price of the product (store price plus transportation cost). There 
are n firms in the market that are assumed to be located equal distance from each other 
around the circle. 
Market with no Online Store 
We start with the model where there are only B&M stores in the market. There are n 
identical B&M stores located in a circular market equal distance apart. Each store sells a 
homogenous product with constant marginal cost C and incurs a fixed cost F which without 
loss of generality we assume equals zero. A consumer’s utility function from purchasing at 
store a is given by: 
µ = θ-Pₐ-tdₐ   
µ = 0  if the consumer doesn’t purchase any product 
Where 
θ = Consumer perceived value of the product 
Pₐ = Price of product in store a 
t = Consumer’s cost per unit of distance 
dₐ = Distance from store a 
A consumer maximizes utility by choosing the store i such that  
θ-Pᵢ-tdᵢ is maximized, i є [1,…,n] 
The market is assumed to be fully covered so that the circumference of the circular market or 
the total market demand equals 1. Figure 1 illustrates an arch taken from the circular market 
containing store a and its adjacent stores namely stores a+1 and a-1. The vertical lines 
represent the utility of a consumer who is located at a store’s location and purchases from that 
store. The height of a diagonal line extending from a store located at ℓ_XXX at a point d 















are decreasing as their distance from the store increases. Consumers are located evenly 
around a circle. A store can only sell to those consumers who gain a positive utility after 
purchasing from it. These consumers are represented by the length engulfed by the diagonal 
lines extending from the store’s location. This length overlaps with the lengths engulfed by 
the diagonal lines extending from the adjacent stores’ locations on both sides which means 
that a store compete for the same consumers only with its adjacent stores.  
 
Figure 1: B&M Stores with No Online Competition 
 From figure 1, we can derive the location of the consumer who is indifferent between 
buying from stores at location ℓₐ and ℓₐ₊₁ as follow 
 θ-Pₐ-(xₐ-ℓₐ)t = θ-Pₐ₊₁-(ℓₐ₊₁-xₐ)t 
Solving for the location of an indifferent consumer xₐ, we get 
 xₐ = 
  ₊₁   
  
 + 
     ₊₁
 
 
The distance between point xₐ and store a is 
 xₐ-ℓₐ = 
  ₊₁   
  
 + 
  ₊₁   
 
 
The distance between point xₐ₋₁ and store a is 
 ℓₐ-xₐ₋₁ = 
  ₋₁   
  
 + 
     ₋₁
 
 
Since we assume that consumers are evenly distributed along the service area of a store and 
each consumer buys one unit of the product, the demand for store a is then 
 xₐ-xₐ₋₁ = [
  ₊₁   
  
  
  ₊₁   
 
] + [
  ₋₁   
  
  





















n is the number of stores in the market. The demand for store a then becomes: 
Dₐ = 






The short-run profit function for store a can be written as: 
  ₐ = (Pₐ-Cₐ)[






We use short-run profit function here so that we can treat fixed cost as a sunk cost or equals 




Equilibrium price is 




Equilibrium profit is 




Market with Monopoly Online Store 
 An introduction of a monopoly online store is included into the model. There are still 
n B&M stores. The utility function of a consumer buying the product online is given by: 
 µ = θ-Pᵢ-T 
Where 
Pᵢ = Price of product online 
T = Cost of shopping online 
The online monopoly store charges a single price for its product and is competes with all 
B&M stores in the market. We assume that both B&M stores and online store have positive 
sales. In other word, θ-Pᵢ-T < θ-Pₐ and θ-Pₐ-td < θ-Pᵢ-T where d is the distance away from 
store a that an indifferent consumer between store a and online store locates. Figure 2 shows 
the consumers’ utility diagram with the presence of an online store. Since the online store is 
charging a single price for all consumers, the utility of each consumer is the horizontal line θ-
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Pᵢ-T. With the presence of an online store, consumers locate further than d distance away 
from a B&M store will purchase from the online store. These consumers also include the 
previously indifferent consumers between a B&M store and its adjacent stores when there is 
no online store. A B&M store now competes for the same consumers of the online store 
instead of its adjacent stores. 
 
 
Figure 2: Market with Online Monopoly 
 
From figure 2, we can derive the location of the consumer whose is indifferent between 
buying from store a and the online store as follow: 
 θ-Pᵢ-T = θ-Pₐ-tdₐ 
Solving for d which is the distance away from a B&M store where an indifferent consumer is 
located: 
 dₐ = 
      
 
  
Consumers located closer than distance d from a B&M store will purchase from that store. 
From this, the demand for a B&M store is 2d. Due to the assumption for the symmetry of 
B&M stores’ locations we have Pₐ= Pₐ₋₁=Pₐ₊₁, and the market is fully covered, the demand 
for the online store becomes: 
 Dᵢ = 1- 2n(



















The short-run profit function for the online store is: 
 πᵢ = (Pᵢ-Cᵢ)[    (
      
 
)] 
where Cᵢ is the marginal cost of the online store. 
The short-run profit function for a B&M store is: 
 πₐ = 2(Pₐ-Cₐ)(






Equilibrium prices are: 
 Pₐ = 






 Pᵢ = 






Equilibrium profits are: 
 πᵢ = (
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 πₐ = 2(












We cannot tell whether a B&M store’s price and profit will be higher or lower than when 
there is no online store by just looking at the price and profit functions. However by looking 
at figure 2 we can see that as long as the online store has positive sales, the demand for a 
B&M store is smaller than when there is no online store, assuming the market is fully 
covered. 
Market with Competitive Equilibrium Online Stores 
Now we assume the online market is competitive so that Pᵢ= Cᵢ, and the profit of all 




Equilibrium price is: 
 Pₐ = 
      
 
 
                                                          
†
 Refer to the proof in appendix 
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